ONTARIO - An arbitration clause implicitly includes the power to award damages unless a contrary intention appears. A commercially unreasonable interpretation of the arbitration clause will not oust the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. Where an arbitration agreement provides that all disputes are subject to arbitration, correctable procedural irregularities do not oust the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.

ONTARIO - Court appointed receiver not bound by contractual arbitration agreement requiring the Receiver to arbitrate in New York as such a requirement would be unfair to the debtor’s creditors and inconsistent with the Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act.

ONTARIO - Arbitral award set aside as the parties did not grant the Arbitrator express authorization to determine the disputes between them. In arbitrations under the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991 S.O. 1991, c.17 (“Act”) or the Model Law (UNICITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration), the Tribunal may decide “ex aequo et bono, or as amiable compositeur” only in circumstances where the parties have expressly authorized it to do so.

ONTARIO - International arbitral award not set aside as due process and procedural standards met. Merely disagreeing with the outcome does not give rise to a review under the guise of Article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law as adopted in the Ontario International Commercial Arbitration Act.

ONTARIO - An application to set aside an arbitrator’s decision as to jurisdiction on the basis that there was no arbitration agreement is a hearing de novo not an appeal.---There is no binding arbitration agreement where there was no meeting of the minds of the parties to arbitrate.--- Where a Court sets aside an arbitral award on the basis that there was no arbitration agreement, section 17(9) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 is inapplicable and there is a right of appeal.

ONTARIO - Where a plaintiff seeks to amend or substitute another entity for itself, the Court should not make the order unless the “new” plaintiff was an intended plaintiff when the action was commenced, and the defendant reasonably ought to have been aware of which entity was “pointing its litigating finger” in its direction.